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We survey three distinct types of financial crises which took place in the 1990s and the 2000s: 1) the
credit implosion leading to severe banking crisis in Japan; 2) The foreign reserves’ meltdown triggered
by foreign hot money flight from frothy economies with fixed exchange rate regimes of developing
Asian economies, and 3) The 2008 worldwide debacle rooted in financial institutional opacity and
reckless aggregate demand management, epi-centered in the US, that spread almost instantaneously
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Financial Crises: 1990-2010 
Financial institutions, banks and shadow-banks 
2 (financial institutions providing credit 
through the derivative trade) are typically arbitrageurs. They borrow short at low rates, lending 
money long for higher returns. Many also offer a wide range of fee generating services, 
including packaging and distributing derivatives.
3 Like any other business, their fortunes are 
affected by fluctuations in aggregate demand and supply; flourishing in good times, and 
floundering in bad. Their health in this way partly depends on the prosperity of others, but the 
relationship is asymmetric because financial institutions together with monetary authorities 
determine the aggregate supply of money and credit. Financial institutions are special. They are 
strategically positioned to directly and indirectly lever more than most other businesses, expand 
the aggregate money and credit supplies, create debt and speculatively affect stock, commodity 
and real estate prices. Self-discipline and competent regulation are essential, but are too often 
compromised by the lure of easy profits, and a regulatory desire to foster financial innovation. 
Financial crises contract aggregate money and credit, diminish the income velocity of money, 
and jeopardize the profitability, solvency and survivability of firms throughout the economy. In 
the direst cases, they can wreck national economic systems (what U.S. Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke calls "systemic risk"). 
                                                            
 
3 Derivative is a generic term for swaps, futures, options, and composites which don't have any intrinsic value 
(proprietary claims to interest, dividends or asset appreciation), their worth depending derivatively on promises to 
acquire, sell, swap and insure securities not yet owned. They take many forms including equity, foreign exchange, 
interest, commodity, credit [credit default swaps (CDS)], mortgage backed, and packaged derivatives. Simple, or 
common derivatives are called "vanilla;" more complex instruments are dubbed "exotic." Their primary purposes are 
leveraging and hedging risk (e.g. traditional short sales) for personal portfolio management or speculation, but this 
has broadened into "shadow banking," where large institutions use derivative instruments to manage their financial 
operations. They serve legitimate business purposes, but also facilitate arbitrage as a business in itself (hedging 
business), and leveraged speculation [including gambling with other people's money (Nick Leeson, Barings Bank 
fiasco)]. All are traded either on exchanges, or over-the-counter, and bear "counterparty" risk as well as security risk 
because "promises" can be broken. "Performance" risk is another seldom considered problem, because even if 
promises are kept, ownership rights to the assets underlying derivatives like mortgage backed securities are often 
obscure and unenforceable. According to the Bank for International Settlements the total notional worth of 
derivatives worldwide was 684 trillion dollars in June 2008. 3 
 
  Financial crises vary in frequency and intensity. There were three major events during the 
last twenty years: the Japanese "zombie bank" debacle, the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
(broadened to include Russia 1998-9, and Argentina 2001-2), and the global financial crisis of 
2008. The first two were respectively local and mostly regional, the third worldwide. Two were 
exacerbated by Keynesian liquidity traps, and debased sovereign debt (as tax revenues dropped 
and bailout money surged) and all were severe, but none approached the 1929 Great Depression's 
ferocity. They provide interesting clues about how a Black Swan catastrophe might have 
unfolded,
4 but are more useful for learning how to deter and mitigate future financial crises and 
recessions(depressions) in perpetually changing technological, regulatory, developmental, 
transitional, and psychological environments. 
  This broad perspective is essential because although historical patterns are instructive, 
they cannot be relied on entirely either to accurately identify causes, or predict future events. 
Things never are completely the same (continuity), as human societies change, learn, adapt and 
evolve. 
  On one hand, recent crises have much in common with the Great Depression. All 
followed asset bubbles. They started in the financial sector and gradually spread to the real 
sector. During these crises, many financial institutions either defaulted or had to be bailed out. 
The Japanese and 2008 global crises appear to have begun with burst bubbles that dried up credit 
and drove short term interest rates toward zero. 
  On the other hand, the crises of the 1990s and 2000s displayed even more differences 
judged from the Great Depression benchmark. Institutions, policies, financial innovation, 
globalization (versus autarkization), regulation, deregulation, floating exchange rates, and 
reduced financial transparency have profoundly altered potentials, conditions, dynamics and 
                                                            
4 Nassim Taleb, Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, New York: Random House, 2007/10. 4 
 
rules of the game. Domestically, nations have established and expanded an alphabet soup of 
oversight and regulatory agencies including the 1932 Glass-Steagall Act (repealed 1999), 1933 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the 1934 Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
  Internationally, the world today is still being swept by a wave of globalization, 
characterized by rapidly growing foreign trade, capital movements, technology transfer, direct 
foreign investment, product and parts outsourcing, information flows, improved transport and 
even increased labor mobility. This contrasts sharply with a post World War I universe in retreat 
from the prewar globalization wave which began in the 1870s, and the protectionist, beggar-thy-
neighbor, isolationist and autarkic tendencies of the 1930s. The pre-Great Depression 
international exchange and settlements mechanism underpinning the old regime has vanished. 
The gold standard, and 1944 Bretton Woods system [which established the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank Group] fixed, and adjustable peg exchange rate 
mechanisms are no long with us, replaced since the early 1970s by flexible exchange rates 
exhibiting a distinctive pattern of core-periphery relations that some describe as Bretton Woods 
II.
5 Free trade globalization has been evangelically promoted by the 1947 General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT), its 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) successor, and diverse 
regional customs unions, while the IMF provided currency and crisis support, and the World 
Bank development assistance. Many claim that as a consequence of these institutional advances, 
emerging nations including China and India have not only been able to rapidly catch up with the 
                                                            
5 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, “An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System,” NBER Working Papers, 
2003. Cf. Barry Eichengreen, “Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods,” NBER Working Papers, 
2004. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber contend that the periphery undervalues its currency to foster export-led 
growth in order to facilitate the rural-urban employment process, and  enabling technology transfer from the center,  
causing embedded trade and financial flow imbalances. 5 
 
west, but in the process accelerated global economic growth above the long run historical norm, 
buttressing prosperity and dampening business cyclical oscillations. 
  Scholarly and governmental attitudes toward managing financial crises and their 
consequences likewise bear little resemblance to those prevailing after World War I and through 
the early years of the Great Depression. Back then, Say's law, and government neutrality were 
gospel. What goes up must and should come down. If financial and related speculative activities 
raised prices and wages excessively, it was believed that the government should let those 
responsible reap what they sowed by allowing prices and wages to freely adjust downward, and 
firms go belly up. There was some, but very little room for stimulatory monetary and fiscal 
policy. The Keynesian revolution as it has gradually unfolded and evolved radically altered 
priorities and attitudes toward macro causality and appropriate intervention. Its seminal 
diagnostic contribution lay in showing the decisive roles of price rigidities, and credit crises in 
causing and protracting depressions. Sometimes, depressions began when real wages were too 
high, inducing output and credit to fall. On other occasions depressions were engendered by 
financial crises [sharp contractions in loanable funds (credit), and consequent liquidity crises], 
and then inured by "sticky wages and prices." Regardless of the sequencing, Keynes claimed that 
two gaps, the first a supply shock, the second impairments of the Walrasian automatic wage and 
price adjustment mechanism (invisible hand), created double grounds for fiscal intervention. 
Policymakers accordingly made the restoration of full employment and economic recovery their 
priorities, dethroning neutrality in favor of activist fiscal and supportive monetary intervention. 
Where once it was resolutely believed that eradicating anticompetitive practices and empowering 
the market were the best strategies for coping with financial crises and their aftermaths, 
Keynesians, neo-Keynesians and post-Keynesians all now believe that fighting deflation and 6 
 
stimulating aggregate effective demand are highest goods, even if this means rescuing those who 
cause crises in the first place, and tolerating other inefficiencies. These attitudes are epitomized 
by Ben Bernanke's unflagging commitment to bail out any institution that poses a "systemic 
threat," and to print as much money as it takes [quantitative easing(QE)],
6 while governments 
around the world push deficit spending to new heights(sometimes passively due to unexpected 
slow economic and tax revenue growth), tempered only by looming sovereign debt crises. They 
also are evident in growth accelerating excess demand strategies, and prosperity promoting 
international trade expansion initiatives. 
  This characterization of novel aspects of the post Great Depression order would have 
been complete two decades ago, but is no longer because it conceals a penchant among 
policymakers to square the circle. Governments today are intent on restoring aspects of pre-Great 
Depression laissez-faire, including the financial sector liberalization and decontrol, at the same 
time they press disciplined, globally coordinated monetary and fiscal intervention. One can 
imagine an optimal regime where regulatory, simulative, and laissez-faire imperatives are 
perfectly harmonized, but not the reality. Consequently, the most novel aspect of the 1990s and 
2000s may well be the emergence of a global economic management regime built on 
contradictory principles that can be likened to stepping full throttle on the accelerator, while 
intermittently and often simultaneously slamming on the regulatory brakes. 
  Which subsets of these factors, including the null subset appear to best explain the 
Japanese, Asian and 2008 world financial crises and their aftermaths? Let us consider each event 
separately, and then try to discern larger, emerging patterns. 
Japan's Financial Crisis: The Lost 1990s and Beyond 
                                                            
6 Ben Bernanke, Essays on the Great Depression, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 7 
 
  Japan was lashed by a speculative tornado 1986-91, commonly called the baburu keiki 
(bubble economy). It was localized, brief, and devastating, with allegedly paralytic consequences 
often described as ushiwanareta junen (two lost decades). The phenomenon was a selective price 
bubble, disconnected from low and decelerating GDP inflation, as well as more vigorous, but 
diminishing rates of aggregate economic growth converging asymptotically toward zero, or 
worse (1982-2010). The bubble was most conspicuously manifested in rabid land and stock 
prices speculation, but also affected Japanese antiques and collectibles (like high quality native 
ceramics and lacquer ware). The Nikkei 225(Neikei Heikin Kabuka) stock market index rose 
from below 7,000 in the early 1980s to 38,916 on December 29, 1989, plummeted to 30,000 
seven months later, continuing to fall with fits and starts thereafter before reaching a 27 year low 
March 10, 2009 at 7,055. It currently (January 2011) hovers around 10,000. At its height, Japan's 
stock market capitalization accounted for 60 percent of the planetary total, now its worth is a 
pale shadow of its former glory. The real estate story was similar. Condo prices increased 140 
percent between 1987 and 1991, on top of already globally sky high values, then plummeted 40 
percent by 1994.
7 At the bubble's apex, the value of a parcel of land near the Emperor's Tokyo 
imperial palace equaled that of California. By 2004, prime "A" property in Tokyo's financial 
district had slumped to less than 1 percent of its peak, with the total destruction of paper wealth 
mounting into the tens of trillions of dollars. The speculative frenzy, predictably ended badly, but 
also displayed uniquely Japanese characteristics. 
  Its technical cause was financial; an institutional willingness to accommodative finance 
domestic hard asset speculation in lieu of low, zero and even negative returns on business 
investment and consumer savings accounts. Corporations and households having piled up 
immense idle cash balances during the miraculous "Golden Sixties," and subsequent prosperity 
                                                            
7 Blumberg Real Estate Economic Institute, Japan, Home Price Indices as of March 18, 2009.  8 
 
through 1985,
8 encouraged to believe that the best was yet to come despite diminishing returns to 
industrial investment, seized on stock and real estate speculation as the next great investment 
frontier. They succumbed to what savvy Wall Streeters call a "bigger pig" mentality, persuading 
themselves that fortunes were at their finger tips because whatever price little pigs paid today for 
stocks, real estate and collectibles, there always would be bigger pigs tomorrow willing to pay 
more. Banks capitulating to the frenzy began binge lending; rationalizing that clients always 
would be able to repay interest and principle from their capital gains, until one fine day they 
ruefully discovered that there were no bigger pigs at the end of the rainbow. This epiphany, 
coupled with a panic driven free fall in assets values and capitalization, left bankers both in a 
predicament and a quandary. 
  The predicament was that slashed asset values by regulatory rule required them to 
contract loan activity, and force borrowers to meet their interest and principal repayment 
obligations even if this meant driving clients into bankruptcy. The quandary was that Japanese 
cultural ethics strongly proscribe maximizing bank profits at borrowers' expense.
9 Through thick 
and thin, Japanese are trained from birth to communally support each other, subordinating 
personal utility and profit seeking to the group's wellbeing. Watching out first for number one is 
never the right thing to do, as it is in competitive, individualistic societies. Tough love isn't an 
option; burden sharing is the only viable course,
10 which in this instance meant refusing to "mark 
capitalizations to market," seeking government assistance, and stalling for time hoping that with 
patience, clients' financial health eventually would be restored. This judgment wasn't wrong. 
Japanese corporations operating under the same cultural obligation immediately began 
                                                            
8 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1982. 
9 Steven Rosefielde, Comparative Economic Systems, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. 
10 Westerners once knew this, but have forgotten. See Ruth Benedict, Sword and the Chrysanthemum, Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1946. 9 
 
earmarking revenues from current operations for debt reduction at the expense of new capital 
formation, and refrained from new borrowings to cover the gap. Banks for their part, not only 
maintained the fiction that outstanding loans were secure, but provided cash for current corporate 
operations and consumer loans at virtually no cost above the bare minimum for bank survival. 
Moreover, they kept their lending concentrated at home, instead of seeking higher returns 
abroad. 
  These actions averted the broader calamities that typically accompany financial crises. 
Japan didn't swoon into hyper depression (GDP never fell, growing 1.7 percent per annum 1990-
93),
11 or experience mass involuntary unemployment. The country wasn't swept by a wave of 
bankruptcies. There was no capital flight, sustained yen depreciation, deterioration in consumer 
welfare,
12 or civil disorder. There was no need for temporary government deficit spending, long 
term "structural deficits," "quantitative easing," comprehensive financial regulatory reforms or 
high profile criminal prosecutions. Interest rates already were low, and although the government 
did deficit spend, arguably it didn't matter in a Keynesian universe because Japanese industrial 
workers in large companies were employed for life (shushin koyo). For pedestrians on hondori 
(Main Street) who blinked, it seemed as if nothing had happened at all beyond a moment of 
speculative insanity. 
  However, matters look very differently to western macro theorists and Japanese 
policymakers, particularly those who erroneously believe that structural deficits, and loose 
monetary policy are the wellsprings of sustainable rapid aggregate economic growth(as distinct 
from recovery). Their prescription for Japan's "toxic asset" problem was to bite the bullet, endure 
the pain, and move on swiftly to robust, ever expanding prosperity. Given ideal assumptions, 
                                                            
11 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Geneva: OECD, 2003, Table C3-b, p.298. 
12 Yasuyuki Sawada,  Kazumitsu Kawata, Masako Ii, and Mark Lee, "Did the Financial Crisis in Japan Affect 
Household Welfare Seriously," Towson University Working Paper, 2010-11, April 2010. 10 
 
biting the bullet is best because it doesn't sacrifice the greater good of maximizing long term 
social welfare for the lesser benefits of short term social protection. Advocates contend that the 
Japanese government fundamentally erred in condoning bank solicitude for the plight of 
endangered borrowers, and abetting banks with external assistance because these actions 
transformed otherwise healthy institutions into "zombie banks"(the living dead),
13 unable to play 
their crucial role in bankrolling investment, technology development and fast track economic 
growth. 
  Their claim has some disputed merit,
14 but also is seriously incomplete. More ails Japan 
than "zombie banks," deflation, the "liquidity trap" Paul Krugman conjectured in the 1990s,
15 
                                                            
13 Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap contend the zombie banks crowd the market and the resulting congestion has real 
effects on the healthy firms in the country. They find the cumulative distortionary impact of investment and 
employment to be substantial. See Ricardo J. Caballero, Takeo Hoshi and Ail K. Kashyap, “Zombie Lending and 
Depressed Restructuring in Japan,” NBER Working paper No.12129, April 2006, revised September 2007. Cf. 
Fumio Akiyoshi and Keiichi Kobayashi, “Banking Crisis and Productivity of Borrowing Firms: Evidence From 
Japan," REITI Discussion Paper, 2008. For a detailed historical review of the Japanese banking crisis see: Akihiro 
Kanaya and David Woo, “The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources and Lessons,” International Monetary 
Fund Working paper, January 2000. 
14 Hideaki Miyajima and Yishay Yafeh, "Japan's Banking Crisis: An Event-Study Perspective, "Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 2007. The authors find that small, undercapitalized firms were the primary victims of the credit 
crunch. These firms contribute little to Japanese productivity growth, undercutting the claim that the financial crisis 
caused Japan's two lost decades.  
15 Paul Krugman contends that after Japan's bubble burst savings rose (consumption collapsed) and the natural 
interest rate (needed for full employment general equilibrium) turned negative, the money interest rate reached the 
lower bound of zero, rendering monetary policy impotent. The actual real interest rate immediately after the crash 
and for decades to come often was slightly positive; the combined effect of modestly falling prices(due partly to 
collapsed demand and retail liberalization in an otherwise keiretsu price-fixed environment), and a zero money 
interest rate. This created a small Keynesian output gap(albeit with negligible unemployment) that was addressed 
with fiscal deficit spending, but it is still possible to argue that deflation and a "liquidity trap" kept, and still keep 
Japan's GDP and employment below its full competitive potential. Krugman contends that Japan's "liquidity trap" 
was the first manifested since the Great Depression, and sends a signal to monetary authorities like Ben Bernanke to 
be alert to the danger. He recommends that Japan's and America's output gaps should be closed with quantitative 
easing (central bank purchase of medium and long term government securities) and nurtured  inflationary 
expectations through a Phillip's mechanism. The suggestion is sound in principle (albeit controversial) for 
contemporary America. Japan's institutions prevent its economy from attaining natural output levels. There may be a 
gap between Japan's achieved and potential institutionally constrained GDP, but it's impossible to reliably measure 
these gaps. See Paul Krugman, "It's Baaack: Japan's Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap," Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, Vol.1998, No.2, 1998, pp.137-205. Paul Krugman, "How Much of the World is in a Liquidity 
Trap," New York Times, March 17, 2010. Cf. Joseph Stiglitz, "New 600B Stimulus Fuels Fears of US Currency 
Wars," Democracy Now, November 5, 2010. Cf. Masahiko Aoki and Gary Saxonhouse, Finance, Governance and 
Competitiveness in Japan, London: Oxford University Press, 2000 Daniel Leigh, "Monetary Policy and the Lost 
Decade: Lessons from Japan," IMF Working Paper, WP/09/232, October 2009. 11 
 
allegations of faulty banking policy,
16 and the hangover from the excesses of accommodatively 
financed stock market and real estate speculation. Stock market and real estate values 
denominated in yen are where they were three decades ago, while prices elsewhere across the 
globe have soared. Japan is more competitive on inflation and exchange rate adjusted basis 
against much of the world than it was in 1990. Moreover, the government has ceaselessly 
pursued a zero interest, loose money policy, in tandem with high deficit spending that has raised 
national debt to 150 percent of GDP. If Japan's growth retardation were really primarily due to 
insufficient "zombie banks" business credit, government stimulus should have mitigated much of 
the problem. 
  There is a better explanation for Japan's two lost decades that has little to do with two 
concurrent, and isolated speculative incidents, one in the stock market, the other in real estate 
with scant sustained effects on production and employment. The advantages of Japan's postwar 
recovery and modernizing catch up diminished steadily in the 1980s and were fully depleted by 
1990, when its per capita GDP hit 81 percent of the American level. Thereafter, Japan's 
culturally imposed, anticompetitive restrictions on its domestic economic activities became 
increasing pronounced, causing its living standard to diminish to 73 percent of America's norm.
17 
Japan, at the end of the 1980s was poised to fall back, with or without a financial crisis, and it is 
in this sense that the two lost decades are being erroneously blamed on the bubble, and its 
"zombie banking" aftermath.
18 Yes, there were eye-popping speculative stock market and real 
                                                            
16 Daniel Leigh, "Monetary Policy and the Lost Decade: Lessons from Japan," IMF Working Paper, 
WP/09/232, October 2009. 
17 Steven Rosefielde, "East-West Convergence and Intra-Asian Leveling," in Steven Rosefielde, Masaaki Kuboniwa 
and Satoshi Mizobata, Two Asias: The Emerging Postcrisis Divide, Singapore: World Scientific, 2010. 
www.ggdc.net/Maddison/oriindex.htm; Russia, China 1991-008,(EU benchmark).xls 
18 It is unclear whether Krugman ascribes Japan's second lost decade 2000-2010 to his conjectured "liquidity trap." 12 
 
estate price busts, but they weren't the national economic debacles they are usually painted to be, 
either in the short or intermediate term. 
  This interpretation raises a larger issue that cannot yet be resolved, but nonetheless is 
worth broaching. Does Japan's fate, presage China's future? When the advantages of catch up are 
depleted, its population grays,
19 and the delusion of permanent miraculous growth subsides, will 
the end of days be punctuated with a colossal, accommodatively financed speculative bust, 
followed by uncountable lost decades? Perhaps not, but still it is easy to see how history may 
repeat itself. 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and Out of Region Spillovers 
  The Asian financial crisis which erupted in 1997 was a foreign capital flight induced 
money and credit implosion.
20 It began as a run on Asian banks by foreign short term depositors, 
and expanded into an assault on government foreign currency reserves, sending shock waves as 
far as Russia's and Argentina's shores.
21 Banks were decimated by acute insolvency. They didn't 
have the cash on hand to cover mass withdrawals of short term deposits because these funds and 
been lent long, sparking asset fire sales, slashed capitalizations and credit and money 
                                                            
19 Japan's population growth had slowed noticeably by 1990, was still positive when its financial crisis hit. Deaths 
first began exceeding births in 2007, and the trend won't be swiftly reversed. Demographers are currently forecasting 
that more than one in three Japanese will be over 65 in 2055, with the working age cohort falling by over a third to 
52 million. Immigration could alleviate the pressure, but the Japanese are resolutely opposed to it because of 
unvoiced fears of being inundated by the Chinese. The long term demographic prospect for China, including the 
possibility for expanded immigration mimics the Japanese pattern due to Deng Xiaoping's one child per family 
policy, and xenophobia. See Nicholas Eberstadt, "China's One-Child Mistake," Wall Street Journal, September 17, 
2007; Eberstadt, "What Population Growth--and Decline--Means for the Global Economy, Foreign Affairs, Vol.89, 
No.6(November/December 2010), pp.54-64 
20Joseph Stiglitz, "Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle,” World Bank Observer, Vol.11, No.2, 1996, pp.151-
177; Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998. Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, "Which Capitalism: Lessons 
from the East Asian Crisis," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol.11, No.3, Fall 1998. Marcel Fratzscher, 
"Why Are Currency Crises Contagious? A Comparison of the Latin America Crisis 1994-5 and the Asian Crisis 
1997-1998," Review of World Economics, Vol.134, No.4, 1998, pp.664-691. Rajan and Zingales contend that "hot" 
money in Asia is white hot, because in the absence of the rule of contract law, in a relationship based culture, short 
term foreign investors are especially wary. 
21 Argentina's money supply contracted sharply because constitutionally its money base was tied peso for peso to its 
foreign reserves, which wreaked havoc on business activity when hot money fled the country under its fixed foreign 
exchange regime. 13 
 
contractions, which in turn triggered widespread business failures, depressions and mass 
unemployment. Thailand's GDP plummeted 8 percent, Indonesia's 14 percent and South Korea's 
6 percent 1997-98.
22 Foreign capital flight(repatriation of short term deposits), compounded by 
insufficient government foreign currency reserves, soon compelled steep devaluations that 
increased import costs, reduced "command national income,"(domestic purchasing power 
including "command" over foreign imports), disordered balance sheets, and otherwise 
diminished real national consumption. 
  These events, unlike Japan's financial crisis eight years earlier, were triggered by foreign 
capital flight rather than domestic stock and real estate meltdowns, and weren't quarantined. The 
crisis started in Thailand, spreading rapidly to Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong,
23 Malaysia, 
and the Philippines, with lesser reverberations in India, Taiwan, Singapore, and Brunei, but 
fledgling market communist regimes in China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were spared runs 
on their banks and foreign currency reserves by stringent state banking and foreign exchange 
controls. They experienced secondary shocks from diminished regional economic activity, but 
otherwise escaped unscathed. 
  The root cause of the runs on Asia's banks and foreign reserves lay in foreign financed 
Asian economic development, and east-west interest rate differentials. After World War II Asia 
became a magnet for both foreign direct and portfolio investment, driving foreign debt-to-GDP 
ratios above 100 percent in the four large ASEAN economies (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
the Philippines) 1993-1996, and local asset market prices to soar(real estate and stocks). Rapid, 
near double digit GDP growth contributed to the asset boom, inspiring confidence that 
investments were safe because Asia's miracles were expected to continue for the foreseeable 
                                                            
22 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Geneva: OECD,2003, Table C3-b, p.298.  
23 Hong Kong's currency board, however, was successfully defended by massive foreign reserve sales, and purchases 
of private equities. 14 
 
future. Thailand's, South Korea's, and Indonesia's GDP growth rates during the decade preceding 
the Asian financial crisis respectively were 9.6, 8.2 and 7.2 percent per annum.
24 At the same 
time, Asia's high interest rates attracted the "carry trade;"  short term borrowing of low yielding 
currencies like the Japanese yen, and their subsequent short term investment in high yielding 
foreign bank deposits and similar liquid debt instruments. Short term "hot" money(including 
large sums from Japanese financial institutions searching for positive returns on near money 
instruments well after Japan's financial crisis ended) poured into the region, creating what 
increasingly came to be perceived as a pan-Asian bubble economy, exacerbated by "crony 
capitalism,"
25 severe political corruption and instability(especially  Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia). 
  Foreign investors steeled by their faith in Asian miracles at first weren't perturbed by the 
frothiness of the orient's markets, but the swelling bubble, compounded by surging current 
account trade deficits undermined their confidence. Speculators, hot money carry traders, and 
other investors gradually grasped that the high returns they were reaping could be wiped out by 
catastrophic devaluations, and began planning for the worst, realizing that those who fled early 
would preserve their wealth; those who dallied would be left holding an empty bag. The 
incentive to flee was increased further by developments outside the region. America's Federal 
Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan began nudging U.S. interest rates higher to deter inflation, 
creating an attractive safe haven for hot money hedging, made more appealing by the prospect of 
an appreciating dollar. 
                                                            
24 Maddison, Op.Cit. 
25 Crony capitalism is a vague term often used to describe market economies, especially in the Third World, where 
business depends heavily on patronage in closed privileged networks of officials, relatives and friends that thrive 
even though under other circumstances their companies would fail the competitive test. These systems are 
considered morally hazardous, corrupt, inefficient and ripe for disaster. See. T.J. Tempel, ed., The Politics of the 
Asian Economic Crisis, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. 15 
 
  The precise combination of factors that ignited full throttle capital flight is open to 
dispute. Southeast Asian export growth dramatically slowed in the Spring of 1996, aggravating 
current account deficits. China started to out compete its regional rivals for foreign directly 
invested loanable funds. The domestic asset bubble began to pop with stock and land prices in 
retreat, forcing large numbers of firms to default on their debts. No doubt for these and many 
other reasons including asymmetric information,
26 opacity, corrupt corporate governance, and 
"crony capitalism;" foreign investors rushed for the exits in early 1997, symbolically culminating 
in the Thai government's decision on July 2, 1997 to abandon its fixed exchange rate, allowing 
the value of its baht to "freely" float. Over the course of the next year, the Baht's value fell 40 
percent. The Indonesian, Philippine, Malaysia and South Korean currencies swiftly followed 
suit, declining respectively 83, 37, 39 and 34 percent. 
  Devaluation, stock and real estate market crashes, bankruptcies, mass unemployment, 
wilted interest rates, and heightened risk aversion dissolved the fundamental disequilibria that 
had beset the region before the fall, only to be immediately replaced by urgent new priorities. 
Downward spirals had to be arrested, economies stabilized, and steps taken not only to achieve 
rapid recovery, but to foster structural changes supporting long term modernization and growth. 
Thai economic planners and their counterparts elsewhere in the region had a coherent overview 
of what needed to be done (mundane partisan squabbles aside), but unlike the Japanese seven 
years earlier, sought external foreign assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and individual nations including China to finance balance of 
payments deficits and facilitate structural adjustment. Japan didn't run a current account deficit 
during its crisis, didn't need foreign exchange rate support, nor structural adjustment assistance 
                                                            
26 Frederic Mishkin, "Lessons from the Asian Crisis," Journal of International Money and Finance, 18, 1999, 
pp.703-23. 16 
 
funding, and so relied entirely on its own resources, whereas the dependency of noncommunist 
developing Asia on the developed west was placed in stark relief. The region of course could 
have gone it alone; however its aspirations for fast track convergence, and counter crisis stimulus 
were clearly tied to its integration into the global financial system, and perhaps acceptance of 
some bad IMF conditionality as the price for the good. 
  Much ink has been split over whether Washington Consensus style monetary and fiscal 
stringency, combined with mandated economy opening structural reforms imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund helped or harmed Asia.
27 This issue is important, but only so for 
present purposes insofar as structural reforms increased or diminished the likelihood of future 
crises. The evidence to date on balance, despite strong claims to the contrary, favors the regional 
decision to follow the IMF's tough love advice. Asia accepted fiscal austerity and monetary 
restraint. It liberalized, amassed large foreign currency reserves, maintained floating exchange 
rates and prospered. After enduring a protracted and perhaps excessively painful period of 
adjustment, Asia not only resumed rapid growth within the IMF's framework, but when push 
came to shove in 2008, weathered the global financial shock wave better than most. It appears 
that although global financial liberalization does pose clear and present speculative dangers as 
IMF critics contend, the risks can be managed with prudence and discipline.
28 
                                                            
27 The term Washington Consensus was coined by John Williamson in 1989 to describe ten standard reforms 
advocated in Washington DC for ameliorating crises and promoting sustainable growth in developing countries. 
These reforms include fiscal discipline, structural investments (in education, etc.), tax rationalization, market 
determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation and rule of 
law. See John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," in Williamson, ed., Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, Washington DC: Institute of International Economics, 2002. Cf. Paul 
Blustein, “The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF,” 
Public Affairs, 2001.  
28 Joseph Stiglitz, "Contagion, Liberalization and the Optimal Structure of Globalization," Journal of Globalization 
and Development, Vol.1, No.2, January 2, 2011. Stiglitz argue that controls can dampen the destabilizing effects of 
productive and financial regional and global integration. Also see Sook-Jong Lee and Hoon Jang, Toward Managed 
Globalization: The Korean Experience, Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2010. 
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  Some have suggested that Russia provides a cogent counter Washington Consensus 
example because having liberalized after its own financial crisis in 1997, and recovered, its 
economy was crushed by the 2008 financial crisis. The claim however is misleading on a variety 
of grounds. There simply are too many  dissimilarities for the Russian case to be persuasive. 
Unlike Asia, Russia was mired in hyper depression when it defaulted on its sovereign Euro 
denominated debt in 1997. It never received significant sums of direct and/or hot money inflows 
into the private sector during the Yeltsin years, had a floating peg exchange rate, and received no 
IMF support after the ruble collapsed. Consequently, it is fatuous to lump Russia into the same 
basket with Asia.
29 Asia's and Russia's systems and contexts are too disparate for them to be 
pooled. The same argument for different reasons applies to Argentina 1999-2001. Russia's and 
Argentina's crises were both linked to sovereign debt issues, but their problematic, and roles 
within the global economic and financial system place them in separate categories. 
  Clarity in this regard is essential for gauging the Asian financial crisis's historical 
significance. Some like Niall Ferguson contend that Asia's financial crisis was the first tremor of 
the second globalization age that emerged after the Bretton Woods international monetary and 
                                                            
29 Andrey Vavilov, The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Steven Rosefielde, "Review of Vavilov's, The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdown," Slavic Review, 2011. 
Also, Steven Rosefielde, "Russia: An Abnormal Country," European Journal of Comparative Economics, 2, 1, pp.3-
16. Cf. Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, "A Normal Country," Foreign Affairs, 84, 2, pp.20-38. The only thing 
that really links Russia's 1998 financial crisis to Asia's is the demonstration effect. When the Asian bubble burst July 
1997, Europeans started to reassess Russia's creditworthiness, after being assured by Anders Aslund, the IMF, 
World Bank and the G-7 that Russia had become a "capitalist market economy" on the road to recovery. The real 
story is that Yeltsin officials after scamming their own people innumerable times including the infamous 1996 
"Loan for Shares" swindle of the millennium, began a massive issue of GKO (Gosudarstvennoye Kratsrochoye 
Obyazatel'stvo; government short term obligations) designed to entice foreign hot money by paying 150 percent 
interest, at a time when it could not cover its budgetary expenses with tax revenues hopelessly in arrears. Yeltsin 
insiders knew that the obligations couldn't be met, but also saw opportunities for self-enrichment and played the 
situation that way. They secured a 22.6 billion IMF rescue package on July 13, swapping GKOs for long-term 
Eurobonds to string the process out, before finally repudiating their GKO and Euro-denominated obligations, and 
abruptly devaluing on August 17, 1998. In the Asian case, foreign capital fled because private sector risks had 
increased. By contrast, in the Russian case it fled because carry traders realized that the Russian government was 
intent on ripping them off. The only question was when, not if, the Kremlin would strike. See Marshall Goldman, 
The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry, London: Routledge, 2003; Anders Aslund, How Russia 
Became a Market Economy, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1995,  Steven Rosefielde and Stefan Hedlund, 
Russia Since 1980: Wrestling with Westernization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 18 
 
financial order collapsed in the late 1970s, early 1980s; weakly implying that future crises will 
mimic Asia's experience.
30 This is implausible. Asia's crisis provides an object lesson on the 
broad danger posed to a wide variety of economies in various stages of economic development 
by overly exuberant international financial liberalization, but doesn't offer a blueprint about how 
things must unfold.
31 
The 2008 Financial Crisis and Subsequent Great Recession 
  The origins of the 2008 financial crisis can be traced to various milestones in the 
construction of the post World War American economy. During the 1950s, Keynesianism 
became orthodox at the same time momentum built to rescind sundry New Deal and wartime 
restrictions on free enterprise including wage-price controls, and fair trade retail pricing (Miller-
Tydings Act 1937; McGuire Act 1952, both rescinded in 1975 by the Consumer Goods Price 
Act). Deregulation in rail, truck and air transportation during the 1970s, ocean transport in the 
1980s, natural gas and petroleum sectors 1970-2000, and telecommunications in the 1990s 
created opportunities for asset value speculation, soon facilitated by complementary deregulation 
initiatives in the financial sector. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), and Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act(1982) both increased 
the scope of permissible bank services, fostered mergers, facilitated collusive pricing, and 
relaxed accounting rules(Moody's for example is permitted to accept fees from insurers it rates). 
Beginning in the early nineties banks shifted from the direct loan business to packaging and 
marketing novel debt instruments like mortgage-backed securities(ultimately including subprime 
loans) to other financial institutions, and shortly thereafter President William Jefferson Clinton 
                                                            
30 Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World, New York: Penguin, 2008; Ferguson, 
"Complexity and Collapse," Foreign Affairs, Vol.89, No.2 (March/April 2010), pp.18-32. 
31 The rebirth of financial globalization and the possibility of serial crises of increasing intensity evokes memories of 
Rudolf Hilferding's Marxist classic Das Finanzkapital, 1910, but the fit is inexact because Hilferding stressed the 
international capitalist concentration of financial power, rather than the competitive variety evident today. 19 
 
approved the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act(1999) enhancing business flexibility. Glass Steagall had 
compartmentalized banks, prohibiting those engaged in stable businesses like mortgages and 
consumer loans from participating in riskier stock brokerage, insurance, commercial and 
industrial activities with the intention of building a firewall against speculative contagion. Its 
repeal ushered in an era of financial merger mania across old divisional lines, allowing 
companies like Citicorp and Travelers Group to unite. 
  These developments, replicated across much of the globe, were all positive from the 
standpoint of neoclassical microeconomic theory because they enhanced competitive efficiency, 
with the proviso that moral hazards and speculative abuses were optimally contained by residual 
regulations ("liberalization"). However, if residual "laissez-faire"(do whatever you want) 
regulations were inadequate, then ensuing financial crisis costs could easily outweigh 
deregulatory efficiency gains. 
  Clearly, there are legitimate grounds for suspecting deregulatory involvement in the 2008 
global financial crisis, but it isn't the only suspect. The financial environment also was placed in 
jeopardy by revisionist Keynesianism. John Maynard Keynes was an apostate monetarist who 
devised and spread the counter-depressionary gospel of deficit fiscal spending in his General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
32 
  He contended that the Great Depression had been caused by deficient aggregate effective 
demand brought about by negative income effects, prolonged by a liquidity trap and claimed that 
full employment could be easily restored by offsetting private hoarding (speculative idle cash 
balances) with government expenditure programs(deficit financed state procurements and 
programs). Other things equal, Keynes insisted competitive markets could and would achieve 
perpetual full employment, if it weren't for income (multiplier) effects, and this destabilizing 
                                                            
32 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London: Macmillan, 1936. 20 
 
force could be overcome without inflation through countercyclical government deficit spending 
and countervailing surpluses. There was no place in Keynes's universe for continuously 
mounting "structural deficits," sovereign debt and/or "managed" inflation that could feed 
speculation and cause financial crises. 
  Nonetheless, immediately after World War II, the U.S. government passed the 
Employment Act of 1946 prioritizing the attainment and maintenance of full employment 
(further codified and expanded in the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act, 1978). The law 
didn't fix quantitative targets, but marked the Truman administration's expansion of federal 
powers to include macroeconomic administration, management and regulation, without explicit 
constitutional sanction, and established the Council of Economic Advisors to aid presidential 
policymaking, as well as the Joint Economic Committee of Congressmen and Senators to review 
executive policies. 
  These actions enabled Washington to go beyond the perimeters of Keynesian orthodoxy, 
whenever full employment could not be sustained with trans-cyclically balanced federal budgets. 
The exclusion remained moot throughout much of the 1950s until William Phillips discovered,
33 
and Paul Samuelson popularized the notion that full employment could only be maintained with 
"excess" monetary and/or fiscal stimulation accompanied by inflationary side-effects (Phillip's 
Curve). Keynes, many concluded was almost right. Deficit spending was essential, but it also 
should be applied no matter how much inflation it generates to secure the higher goal of full 
employment. Full employment zealots insist that governments are "morally" obliged to deficit 
spend forever, a position still widely maintained despite Milton Friedman and  Edmund Phelps 
                                                            
33 William Phillips, "The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in the 
United Kingdom 1861-1957," Economica, 25(100), pp.283-299. 21 
 
demonstrations that Phillips was wrong in the medium and  long runs by omitting inflationary 
expectations. . 
  The orthodox Keynesian straitjacket was loosened further by Walter Heller, Chairman of 
President John Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisors, 1961-64, who introduced across the 
board tax cuts as a counter-recessionary stimulus, even though this meant creating credit not just 
for investment, but for consumption as well. Keynes's employment and income multiplier theory 
required stimulating investment as the only legitimate method for combating deficient aggregate 
effective demand [Works Projects Administration 1932(WPA) providing 8 million jobs, and later 
investment tax credits]. He argued that new investment creates new jobs, wages, and derivatively 
increases consumption, whereas deficit consumption spending via diminished marginal 
propensities to consume merely transfers purchasing power from one recipient to another, 
without increasing employment. Heller's revisionism brushed Keynes's concerns aside, making it 
possible for politicians to claim that any deficit spending which benefited them and their 
constituents would stimulate aggregate economic activity and employment, including 
intertemporal income transfers from one consumer's pocket tomorrow to the next today. 
  This logic was extended by falsely contending that deficit spending and expansionary 
monetary policy accelerate long term economic growth. Although, there are no grounds for 
claiming that structural deficits and lax monetary policy accelerate scientific and technological 
progress (the ultimate source of sustainable economic growth), policymakers couldn't resist the 
temptation to assert that deficit spending and inflation are indispensible for maximizing current 
and future prosperity. The ploy has been successful as a political tactic, making deficits and 
inflation seem more palatable, but also has widened the door to compounding past abuses by 22 
 
upping the ante whenever the economy sours. Policymakers’ reflex isn't to retrench, but to do 
more of what caused problems in the first place. 
 Academic  macroeconomists  likewise  succumbed to wishful thinking, brushing aside the 
speculative momentum embedded in postwar institutional liberalization and fiscal indiscipline. 
Influenced by Robert Lucas, and Phil Kidland and Edward Prescott
34, the conventional wisdom 
2000-2008 came to hold that business cycle oscillations were primarily caused by productivity 
shocks that lasted until price- and wage-setters disentangled real from nominal effects. These 
shocks sometimes generated inflation which it was believed was best addressed with monetary 
policy. Accordingly, central bankers were tasked with the mission of maintaining slow and 
stable, Phillips Curve compatible inflation. Although, central bankers were supposed to be less 
concerned with real economic activity, many came to believe that full employment and two 
percent inflation could be sustained indefinitely by "divine coincidence."
35 This miracle was said 
to be made all the better by the discovery that real economic performance could be regulated 
with a single monetary instrument, the short term interest rate. Happily, arbitrage across time 
meant that central bankers could control all temporal interest rates, and arbitrage across asset 
classes implied that the U.S. Federal Reserve could similarly influence risk adjusted rates for 
diverse securities. Fiscal policy, which had ruled the roost under the influence of orthodox 
Keynesianism from 1950-80 in this way, was relegated to a subsidiary role aided by theorists' 
beliefs in the empirical validity of Ricardian equivalence arguments, and skepticism about lags 
and political priorities. The financial sector likewise was given short shift, but this still left room 
                                                            
34Kydland, F and E Prescott (1982), “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations”,  Econometrica 
50(6):1345-1370. 
 Lucas, Robert  Jr. (1972), “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money”, Journal of Economic Theory, 4(2), 
April:103-124. 
Lucas, Robert Jr.(2003), "Macroeconomic Priorities," American Economic Review, 93(1), 2003, pp.1-14. 
35 The term refers to situations where stabilizing inflation is the same as stabilizing output. 23 
 
for other kinds of non-monetary intervention. The consensus view held that automatic stabilizers 
like unemployment insurance should be retained to share risks; that are to assist in case there 
were any unpredictable shocks. Commercial bank credit similarly continued to be regulated, and 
federal deposit insurance preserved to deter bank runs, but otherwise finance was lightly 
supervised; especially "shadow banks", hedge funds and derivatives. 
  A similar myopia blinded many to the destabilizing potential of Chinese state controlled 
foreign trading. As postwar free trade gained momentum, liberalizers not only grew increasingly 
confident that competitive commerce was globally beneficial, but that trade expansion of any 
kind increased planetary welfare. Consequently, few were perturbed after China's admission to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 either by the conspicuous undervaluation of the 
renminbi (RMB) fixed to support export-led development, or by Beijing's ever mounting dollar 
reserves. It was assumed that even if China overexported (at the expense of foreign importables 
jobs), this would be offset by employment gains in the exportables sector as China increased its 
import purchases. "Overtrading" as theory teaches is suboptimal, but not seriously harmful to 
aggregate employment and has the compensatory virtue of expanding international commerce. 
  However, a fly spoiled the ointment. The Chinese (and some others like Brazil) chose to 
hold idle dollar reserve balances (hoard), instead of importing as much as they exported. 
Beijing's dollar reserves grew from 250 billion in 2001 to 2.6 trillion in 2010. In a perfectly 
competitive universe this wouldn't matter because others would borrow these unused funds, but 
not so in a Keynesian world were rigidities of diverse sorts transform idle cash balances into 
deficient aggregate effective demand, and simultaneously serve as a vehicle for financial hard 
asset speculation. For reasons that probably involve the Chinese Communist Party's desire to 
protect privileged producers in both its domestic importables and exportables sectors (implicit, 24 
 
stealth "beggar-thy-neighbor" tactics), Beijing became an immense source of global real and 
financial sector disequilibrium, contributing both to the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. 
Chinese leaders in its state controlled foreign trade system had, and have the power to reset the 
renminbi exchange rate, and increase import purchases, but they chose, and are still choosing to 
do neither.
36 
  The cornerstones of 2008 financial crisis in summary are: 1) an evolving deregulatory 
consensus, 2) a mounting predilection for excess deficit spending, 3) a penchant for imposing 
political mandates on the private sector like subprime mortgage, student loan lending, and excess 
automobile industry health benefits which drove GM and Chrysler into bankruptcy in 2009, 4) 
waning concern for labor protection manifest in stagnant real wages and therefore flagging mass 
consumption demand,[shift towards promoting the security of other social elements] 5) a 
proclivity to prioritize full employment over inflation, 6) the erroneous belief that structural 
deficits promote accelerated economic growth, 7) the notion that government insurance 
guarantees, off budget unfunded obligations like social security, and mandated preferences to 
savings and loans banks were innocuous, despite the 160 billion dollar savings and loans debacle 
of the late 1980-1990s, 8) deregulatory myopia, and activists social policy, including the 
encouragement of subprime loans, adjustable rate mortgages(ARM), and tolerance of finance 
based credit expansion which flooded the globe with credit,
37 9) lax regulation of post-Bretton 
                                                            
36 Steven Rosefielde, "China's Perplexing Foreign Trade Policy: "Causes, Consequences, and a Tit for Tat Solution," 
American Foreign Policy Interests," Winter 2011. 
37 Subprime mortgages involved loans to people likely to encounter difficulty maintaining their repayment 
schedules. ARMS allowed homeowners to borrow inexpensively, but obligated them to pay more if interest rates 
rose.  Additionally, during the new millennium it was common for banks to waive down payments, enabling 
"owners" to walk away from their properties when housing prices (and values) fell, leaving banks with an  huge 
inventory of bankruptcy repossessions and distressed sales. The Clinton Administration pushed subprime lending. 
The value of U.S. subprime mortgages in 2007 was 1.3 trillion dollars. In an inflationary environment, driven in part 
by people borrowing from their home's inflationary premium, home buying was transformed into a speculative 
game. The ratio of global liquidity to global GDP quadrupled 1980-2007; doubling 2000-2007. Cross border capital 
flows decupled 1990-2007 from 1.1 to 11.2 trillion dollars. Derivatives rose from virtually zero in 1990 to 684 25 
 
Woods international capital flows(early 1970s) 10) an indulgent attitude toward destructive 
financial innovation apparent in the 1987 "program trading," and 2000-02 "dot.com bubble" 
stock market crashes,
38 as well as the 1998 Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund 
collapse,
39 10) a permissive approach to financial auditing,
40 including mark to face valuation for 
illiquid securities, 14) the creation of a one-way-street, too big to fail mentality that transformed 
prudent business activity into a venal speculative game on Wall Street, main street and in 
Washington, 13) the 2001 Wall Street stock crash which shifted speculative exuberance from 
stocks to hard assets(commodities, land, natural resources, precious metals, art, antiques, 
jewelry), and paved the way for the subordination of individual stock market investment to 
institutional speculation,
41 14) credit easing in the wake of the dot.com bust, orchestrated by the 
Federal Reserve which started a consumer credit binge, reflected in high consumption and low 
savings rates, adding fuel to the inflationary fires, 15) 9/11 and the Iraq war which swelled 
America's federal budget deficit and triggered a petro bubble(and broad based commodity 
inflation), 16) an epochal surge in global economic growth led by Brazil, India, Russia and 
China(BRICs) wrought by technology transfer, outsourcing and foreign direct investment, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
trillion dollars in 2007. American nonfinancial debt outpaced GDP growth since 2007 by 8 trillion dollars. See 
Quinn Mills, World Financial Crisis 2008-2010: What Happened, Who is to Blame and How to Protect Your 
Money, Create Space, 2009, p.51. 
38 The dot.com bubble began shortly after Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan's "irrational exuberance" speech 
on December 5, 1996. For proof that dot.com stocks were grossly overvalued see J. Bradford Delong and Konstatine  
Magin, "A Short Note on the Size of the Dot-Com Bubble," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
12011, January 2006. The Nasdaq composite index peaked at 5,132.52 on March 10, 2000 and bottomed at 1,108.49 
on October 10, 2002. The Enron accounting scam, tied to energy deregulation and lax accounting by Arthur 
Anderson also contributed to the slaughter. 
39 Nobel Prize laureate Myron Scholes and Robert Merton famous for devising a new method for valuing derivatives 
were members of LTCMs board of directors. 
40 Richard Bowen, III testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that mortgage underwriting standards 
collapsed in the final years of the US housing bubble (2006-2007). Sixty percent of mortgages purchased by 
Citicorp from some 1,600 mortgage companies were defective. Clayton Holdings reported in parallel testimony that 
only 54 percent of mortgage loans met their originators' underwriting standards. 
41 Jack Boogle, Founder of Vanguard Group privately estimated that 40 trillion of the 41 trillion traded on world 
stock exchanges in 2009 year is speculative. The institutional share of American stock market investment has risen 
in the last two decades from 8 percent to 70 percent. 26 
 
induced a wave of speculative euphoria, 17) Chinese stealth "beggar-thy-neighbor" renminbi 
undervaluation and dollar reserve hoarding, reflected in Chinese under importing, a burgeoning 
American current account deficit and an  overseas "savings glut" which exacerbated inflationary 
pressures, raised prices for American treasuries and lowered interest rates,[widely 
mischaracterized as "financing imports"] 18) the 2006 American housing bust which toxified 
mortgage and derivative financial instruments,
42 19) the emergence of "institutional" bank runs, 
where financial and nonfinancial companies flee repurchase(repo) agreements, 20) rapidly 
mounting sovereign debt in Iceland, several European Union states,
43 as well as similarly 
                                                            
42 American housing prices peaked in early 2005 and the Case-Shiller home price index began falling in 2006. 
Prices plunged 34 percent thereafter, bottoming in 2009, and are expected to continue declining in 2011 despite 
more than a trillion dollars of government support. On December 24, 2009 the Treasury Department pledged 
unlimited support for the next three years to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, despite 400 billion dollars in losses. The 
bubble was predicted by Robert Shiller in 2000. See Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000. Shiller, The Subprime Solution: How Today's the Global Financial Crisis Happened, and 
What to Do About It, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. As early as 1997, Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan fought to keep derivates unregulated, a goal codified in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
of 2000. Derivative like credit default swaps (CDS) were used to hedge or speculate against particular credit risks. 
Their volume increased 100-fold 1998-2008, with estimates of the debt ranging as high as 47 trillion dollars. Total 
over-the-counter derivative notional value rose to 683 trillion dollars by June 2008. Warren Buffet described the 
phenomenon as "financial weapons of mass destruction." The Economist, September 18, 2008. 
43 Debt obligations issued by nation states are called sovereign debt. Superficially, it might be supposed that 
sovereign bonds are more secure than their corporate equivalents, but the reverse often is the case because under the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, countries cannot be forced to honor their obligations. Creditors only recourse is to 
passively accept rescheduling, interest reductions or even repudiation. See Jonathan Eaton and Raquel Fernandez, 
"Sovereign Debt," in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds., Handbook of International Economics, Vol. III, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science B.V., 1995, chapter 39. Sovereign debt initially played a subsidiary role in the 2008 financial crisis. 
The collapse of Iceland's main banks, and 77 percent stock plunge in September 2008, prompted rating agencies to 
drastically cut Iceland's sovereign debt rating from A+ to BBB-. The IMF arranged a rescue package November 19, 
2008, but the cat was out of the bag. Suddenly, investors became aware that the global financial crisis's scope might 
be much wider than earlier supposed, raising the specter of a worldwide financial collapse that wasn't reversed until 
March 2009. Nonetheless, sovereign debt fears reemerged in 2010 due to credit rating reductions for Greek, Irish, 
Portuguese, and Spanish sovereign debt that forced an EU to intervene in defense of these members. The rescue 
involved loans for conditionality, where credit impaired sovereigns were compelled to pledge the adoption of 
austerity measures reducing their "structural deficits." The problem which could easily expand to include Italy, and 
others, doesn't appear to jeopardize the international financial system immediately, but is a bad omen for the future. 
Additionally, many worry that if rating cuts contingent on budgetary debt reductions don't cease, it could force the 
European Union to abandon the Euro as a common currency, and even result in the EU's dissolution. The root cause 
of the EU's problem isn't excessive debt per se, but the ability of less productive members to run EU threatening 
deficits in a common currency regime, without the option of individual country currency devaluation. See Bruno 
Dallago and Chiara Guglielmetti, "The EZ in the Prospects of Global Imbalances: Two Europes?" in Steven 
Rosefielde, Masaaki Kuboniwa and Satoshi Mizobata, eds., Two Asias: The Emerging Postcrisis Divide, Singapore: 
World Scientific, 2011. As we know from the theory of optimum currency areas, there are benefits and costs to 
currency integration. Benefits are the reduced costs of doing business. If they are large, forming currency areas lead 27 
 
onerous debt obligations in California and Illinois, 21) a naive faith in "divine coincidence," 22) 
a colossal regulatory blunder in imposing "mark to market" valuation (Fair Accounting 
Standard:FAS 157) of illiquid assets from November 15, 2007,
44 23)increased separation of 
ownership from corporate control enabling top executives to excessively compensate themselves, 
including golden parachute perks. CEOs were institutionally encouraged to gamble with 
shareholders' money at negligible personal risk. The 2008 global financial crisis thus wasn't just 
a garden variety White Swan business cyclical event. It was a long time coming, and prospects 
for a repetition depend on whether underlying structural disequilibria, including political 
indiscipline are redressed.
45 
The Shock Wave 
  The defining event of the 2008 global financial crisis was a "hemorrhagic stroke;" a 
paralytic implosion of the loanable funds market that seemingly brought the global monetary and 
credit system to the brink of Armageddon. The September 2008 emergency was caused by the 
terrifying realization that major financial institutions, especially those connected with hedge 
funds couldn't cover their current obligations either with asset sales or short term bank credit 
because confidence had been lost in the value of their assets, and short term lending suddenly 
ceased. People everywhere were panicked at the prospect of cascading financial bankruptcies, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
to large increases in trade. This is not what happened in the Euro-zone after the monetary union was established. The 
key problem is building a consensus on how best to restore price equilibrium after asymmetric shocks, booms and 
slumps that disparately affect individual member states. Labor mobility (Robert Mundell), fiscal integration (Peter 
Kenen), a strong central bank serving as lender of last recourse, and a fiscal unit to bail out sovereign debts lubricate 
equilibration, but don't automatically resolve conflicting member interests. The EU sovereign debt issue is tutoring 
members about the trade-offs that must be made, if the monetary union is to survive. 
44 FDIC chairman William Issac places much of the blame for the subprime mortgage crisis on the SEC for its fair-
value accounting rules, misapplied in times of crisis. The Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008, signed October 7, 
suspended mark to market asset pricing during crises. The new regulation is FAS 157-d. 
45 "Morici: Down Grade US Treasury’s to Junk" Yahoo! Finance, December 20, 2010. Peter Morici contends that 
Congress and the White House made no comprise whatsoever in extending and expanding the Bush tax cuts, 
including a temporary 33 percent cut in poor and middle class social security taxes, ballooning the federal deficit to 
1.5 trillion dollars in 2011; to say nothing of off budget deficits ten times as large. 28 
 
where the securities of failed companies contaminated the value of other assets, triggering 
margin calls, shuttered credit access, lost savings, bank runs, stock market crashes, liquidity 
crises, universal insolvency, economic collapse and global ruination. All crises are ominous, but 
this one seemed as if it just might degenerate into a Black Swan debacle, equal to or greater than 
the Great Depression of 1929. After all, the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank had 
reassured the public that the forced sale of the "risk management" investment banking firm Bear 
Stearns to JPMorgan Chase on March 24, 2008 for 5.8 percent of its prior high value had fully 
solved the subprime loan, mortgage and derivative securitization threat, but subsequent events 
revealed that Bear Stearn was just the tip of a potentially Titanic sinking iceberg, with American 
and European banking losses 2007-2010 forecast by the International Monetary Fund to reach 1 
trillion, and 1.6 trillion dollars respectively.
46 An additional 4 to 5 trillion dollars are expected to 
be lost through 2011, and although the Dow Jones Industrial Average fully recovered from the 
September 2008 highs by December 2010, 42 percent of its value was wiped out at the stock 
market crash's trough.
47 
  The other shoe began dropping on September 7, 2008 when the Federal National 
Mortgage Association(Fannie Mae), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation(Freddie 
Mac)[specializing in creating a secondary mortgage market] were placed into conservatorship by 
                                                            
46 Bear Stearns, founded in 1923 had survived the 1929 Wall Street crash, and achieved celebrity status in the new 
millennium because of Lewis Ranieri's pioneering innovation of the mortgage backed securitization business. Its 
problems became public in June 2007 when the company pledged a 3.2 billion dollar collateralized loan 
(collateralized debt obligation: CDO) to rescue one of its hedge funds. The CDOs were thinly trade, and when Bear 
Stern encountered liquidity problems, Merrill Lynch seized 850 million dollars worth, but only realized 100 million 
in forced liquidation. During the week of July 16, 2007 Bear Stearns acknowledged that its two CDO supported 
hedge funds had lost nearly all their value amid a rapid decline in the subprime mortgages market. On March 14, 
2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York agreed to grant Bear Stearns a 25 billion dollar loan collateralized by 
free and clear assets from Bear Stearn in order to provide liquidity for 28 days. The deal however was changed two 
days later into a forced bailout when the Federal Reserve decided that the loan would be given to Bear Stearn's 
shotgun bride, JP Morgan, enticed into the marriage by a 35 billion non-recourse Federal Reserve loan. The action 
approved by Ben Bernanke, putting public money at risk, was justified by the necessity of preventing systemic 
failure, and forestalling the need for further intervention. 
47 The Dow Jones Industrial Average peaked October 9, 2007 at 14,164, and bottomed March 9 at 6,470. In early 
September 2008, it traded around 11,500, just where it stood at the end of 2010. 29 
 
the Federal Housing Financing Agency after new mark to market accounting regulations(FAS 
157) created havoc in the mortgage industry.
48 At the time, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held 12 
trillion dollars worth of mortgages.
49 Three days later on September 10, 2008, the "risk 
management" investment bank Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy after having failed to find 
a buyer, or acquire a Federal bailout to cover a 4 billion dollar loss. Merrill Lynch finding itself 
in similar dire straits was sold to the Bank of America on the same day. Six days later, the 
Federal Reserve announced an 85 billion dollar rescue loan to the insurance giant American 
International Group (AIG), also heavily involved in "risk management" securitization activities. 
The news ignited a wave of Wall Street short selling, prompting the SEC to suspend short selling 
immediately thereafter. Then on September 20 and 21, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson 
and Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke appealed directly to Congress for an endorsement of 
their 700 billion dollar emergency loan package designed to purchase massive amounts of sour 
mortgages from distressed institutions. Forty eight hours later, Warren Buffett bought 9 percent 
of Goldman Sachs, another "risk management" investment bank for 5 billion dollars to prop the 
company up. On September 24 Washington Mutual became America's largest bank failure ever, 
and was acquired by JPMorgan Chase for 1.9 billion. 
These cumulating disasters, exacerbated by parallel developments in Europe and many 
other parts of the globe addicted to structural deficits, Phillips Curve justified inflation, financial 
deregulation, asset backed mortgages, derivatives, electronic trading, and hard asset speculation 
sent shock waves through the global financial system, including the withdrawal of hundreds of 
billions of dollars from money market mutual funds(an aspect of the shadow banking system), 
                                                            
48 Lending institutions were abruptly required to write their illiquid mortgage assets down to rapidly falling current 
values, forcing them to sell securities to raise capital, and generating a vicious downward credit spiral. 
49 Both firms were subsequently delisted from the New York stock exchange, June 2010 because their share prices 
fell below one dollar. 30 
 
depriving corporations of an important source of short term borrowing. The London Interbank 
Offered Rate(LIBOR), the reference interest rate at which banks borrow unsecured funds from 
other banks in the London wholesale money market soared, as did TED spreads[T Bills versus 
Eurodollar future contracts], spiking to 4.65 percent on October 10, 2008, both indicating that 
liquidity was being rapidly withdrawn from the world financial system. In what seemed like the 
blink of an eye, the global financial crisis not only triggered a wave of worldwide bankruptcies, 
plunging production, curtailed international trade, and mass unemployment, but morphed into a 
sovereign debt crisis. Countries like Iceland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain found 
themselves mired in domestic and foreign debt that dampened aggregate effective demand, 
spawned double digit unemployment and even raised the specter of European Union 
dissolution.
50 
  These awesome events, together with collapsing global equity, bond and commodity 
markets unleashed a frenzy of advice and emergency policy intervention aimed at stemming the 
hemorrhaging, bolstering aggregate effective demand, and repairing regulatory lapses to restore 
business confidence. FAS 157-d (suspension of mark to mark financial asset pricing) broke the 
free fall of illiquid, mortgage backed assets valuations, offering some eventual support in resale 
markets. The Emergency Stabilization Relief Act bailed out system threatening bankruptcy 
candidates through emergency loans, and toxic asset purchases. FDIC savings deposits insurance 
was increased from 100,000 to 250,000 dollars per account to forestall bank runs. The SEC 
temporarily suspended short selling on Wall Street. The government pressured banks to postpone 
foreclosures invoking a voluntary foreclosure moratorium enacted in July 2008. The Federal 
Reserve and Treasury resorted to quantitative easing(essentially printing money) to bolster 
                                                            
50 Bruno Dallago and Chiara Guglielmetti, "The EZ in the Prospects of Global Imbalances: Two Europes?" in 
Steven Rosefielde, Masaaki Kuboniwa and Satoshi Mizobata, eds., Global Shock Wave: Rethinking Asia's Future in 
Light of the Worldwide Financial Crisis and Depression 2008-2010, New York: Routledge, 2011. 31 
 
liquidity and drive short term government interest rates toward zero, effectively subsidizing 
financial institutions at depositors' expense. The federal government quadrupled its budgetary 
deficit in accordance with Heller's neo-Keynesian aggregate demand management tactic, 
concentrating on unemployment and other social transfers, instead of the direct investment 
stimulation advocated by Keynes.
51 Committees were formed to devise bank capital "stress 
tests," coordinate global banking reform,
52 improve auditing and oversight, prosecute criminal 
wrong doing including Ponzi schemes (Bernard Madoff),
53 and investigate regulatory reform of 
derivatives and electronic trading(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, July 2010).
54 In Europe many imperiled banks were temporarily nationalized, and a series of 
intra-EU austerity and rescue programs launched. In the larger global arena, the International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank and others provided emergency assistance, and the deep problem of 
Chinese state controlled trading was peckishly broached. 
                                                            
51 Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi, How the Great Recession Was Brought to an End, www.economy.com/mark-
zandi/documents/End-of-Great-Recession.pdf the breakdown of the American 1 trillion dollar counter crisis fiscal 
stimulus package is divisible into two baskets: spending increases ($682 billion) and tax cuts ($383 billion). The 
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 spent $170 billion. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
disbursed another $582 billion dollars on infrastructure($147 billion; including $109 billion dollars of 
"nontraditional" infrastructure); transfers to state and local governments($174 billion dollars: Medicaid $87 billion 
dollars, education $87 billion dollars), transfers to persons($271 billion dollars: social security $13 billion dollars, 
unemployment assistance $224 billion dollars, food stamps $10 billion dollars and Cobra payments $24 billion 
dollars). Tax cuts under the 2009 act totaled $190 billion dollars, allocated to businesses ($40 billion dollars), 
making work pay ($64 billion dollars), first time homebuyer tax credit ($14 billion dollars) and individuals ($72 
billion dollars). Subsequently, the government also provided $55 billion dollars of extended unemployment 
insurance benefits. See Table 10, p.15. More than 90 percent of the stimulus was targeted at bolstering aggregate 
effective demand through transfers and tax rebates in the post 1960s Heller fashion, rather than in direct investment 
assistance(traditional infrastructure, business tax credits and first time home buyer credits) as Keynes himself 
recommended. 
52 "Faulty Basel: Why More Diplomacy Won't Keep the Financial System Safe," Foreign Affairs, Vol.89, 
No.3 (May/June 2010). 
53 Bernard Madoff, non-executive chairman of NASDAQ and founder of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, 
LLC was sentenced to 150 years imprisonment and forfeiture of 17 billion dollars for a Ponzi scheme fraud costing 
investors 10-20 billion dollars, exposed by the 2008 financial crisis. Robert Stanford, Chairman of the Stanford 
Financial Group was charged with a similar fraud. His trial is scheduled for 2011. 
54 The Dobb-Frank Act contains 16 titles, strewn with prohibitions, rules and rate fixing. It is difficult to render a 
summary judgment, but has been criticized for not addressing the too big to fail issue, and indulging political at the 
expense of regulatory goals. 32 
 
With the advantage of hindsight, it is evident the American government's Troubled Asset 
Relief Program(TARP), including the "cash for clunkers" program, other deficit spending and 
quantitative easing, passive acceptance of Chinese under-importing(dollar reserve hoarding), 
continued indulgence of destructive speculative practices(program trading, hedge funds, and 
derivatives), together with regulatory reforms and confidence building initiatives didn't cause a 
Black Swan meltdown and the subsequent hyper-depression many justifiably feared. Some of 
these same policies may deserve credit for fostering a recovery, tepid as it is, but also can be 
blamed for persistent, near double digit unemployment, a resurgence of commodity, stock and 
foreign currency speculation, and the creation of conditions for a sovereign debt crisis of biblical 
proportions in the years ahead when the globe is eventually confronted with tens of trillions of 
dollars of unfunded, and un-repayable obligations.
55 
  At the end of the day, it shouldn't be surprising that the institutionalized excess demand 
disequilibrium of the American and European macroeconomic management systems would 
produce some relief, even though their policies were inefficient and unjust.  Financial stability is 
being gradually restored, and output is increasing, but the adjustment burden has been borne 
disproportionately by the unemployed, would be job entrants, small businesses, savers, 
pensioners and a myriad of random victims, while malefactors including politicians and 
policymakers were bailed out. Moreover, the mentality and institutions which created the crisis 
in the first place remain firmly in command. Incredibly, the Obama administration under cover 
of the Frank-Dobb Act already has begun mandating a massive expansion of the very same 
subprime loans largely responsible for the 2006 housing crisis and the 2008 financial debacle 
                                                            
55 The figure includes unfunded social security obligations. 33 
 
that swiftly ensued.
56 This action and others like it will continue putting the global economy 
squarely at Black Swan risk until academics and policymakers prioritize financial stability over 
parochial, partisan, ideological and venal advantage.
57 
  The 2008 financial crisis also has placed macroeconomic theory in a quandary. The 
"divine coincidence" is now seen for the pipedream that it was, but there is no new consensus to 
replace it other than the pious hope that structural deficits, loose monetary policy and better 
financial regulation (aggregate demand management) will foster prosperity no matter how 
irresponsibly politicians, policymakers, businessmen, financial institutions, special interests and 
speculators behave.
58 Worse still, there seems to be little prospect that a constructive consensus 
soon will emerge capable of disciplining contemporary societies for the greater good by 
promoting optimal efficiency, growth and economic stability. The global economy is flying 
blind, propelled by a disequilibrium mentality (some say herd mentality) that spells trouble ahead 
with scant hope for learning by doing. Most players seem to believe that contemporary monetary 
and fiscal management, combined with better financial regulation will work well enough, but 
they appear to be conflating wishful thinking with economic science.  
                                                            
56 Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto, "How the Government is Creating Another Bubble," AEI Articles and 
Commentary, December 27, 2010. Wallison and Pinto contend that the Dobb-Frank Act allows the administration to 
substitute the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as the principal and 
essentially unlimited provider of subprime mortgage, at taxpayers’ expense. Since the 2008 government takeover of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises' regulator has restricted them to purchasing 
high quality mortgages, with affordable housing requirements mandated in 1992 relaxed. This reduces the future 
risk, but the good is entirely negated by shunting the old destructive practices to the FHA on the pretext of 
supporting the soundness of the entire mortgage industry. The gambit in the usual way, allows the administration to 
present a prudent face with regard to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while diverting attention from the 400 billion 
dollar loss previously racked up by  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and recklessly reprising the Housing and Urban 
Development Administration’s (HUD) prior destructive policies. Peter J. Wallison, Alex Pollock and Edward Pinto, 
"Taking the Government Out of Housing Finance: Principles for Reforming the Housing Finance Market, AEI 
Online, January 20, 2011. Wallison, Pollock and Pinto report that the US government sponsored 27 million 
subprime and Alt-policies. To correct the situation they recommend that the government get out of the housing 
finance business. Government regulation should be restricted to ensuring mortgage credit quality. Assistance to low-
income families should be on-budget. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be privatized. 
57 Janine Wedel, Shadow Elites: How the World's New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government and the 
Free Market, New York: Basic Books, 2009. 
58 William White, "Some Alternative Perspectives on Macroeconomic Theory and Some Policy Implications,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, Working Paper No.54, July 2010. 34 
 
Prospects 
  A great deal of water has flowed under the bridge in the past two decades. There were 
three distinct types of financial crisis: 1) a domestic money and credit implosion, where foreign 
direct investment and hot money played no significant role (Japan); 2) an insolvency and foreign 
reserves meltdown triggered by foreign hot money flight from frothy economies with fixed 
exchange rate regimes (developing Asian), where domestic speculative excesses were partly 
linked with foreign direct investment, and 3) a worldwide debacle rooted in reckless aggregate 
demand management and financial deregulation by a "partnership" of politicians, administrators, 
businesspersons and activists in significant part for personal gain that started in America, but 
spread almost instantaneously across the globe, mostly through international financial networks 
(except Asia where export shocks were primary). The last is the most dangerous, and most likely 
soon to recur because high rolling losers were compensated out of public funds,
59 self-interested 
aggregate demand managers are unrepentant, and publics are dazed by fast talk. The least likely 
near term recidivists are developing nations like those in Asia which through bitter experience 
adopted flexible foreign exchange regimes and now maintain adequate foreign currency reserves, 
but over the longer term remain vulnerable to invasive moral hazard and social turmoil. 
Countries like China fall in the middle. On one hand, they are insulated against capital flight by 
stringent state controls, but on the other they are at high risk for destructive rent-seeking and 
turbulent domestic asset speculation. International financial laissez-faire which accompanied the 
second wave of globalization after the fall of the Bretton Woods system obviously has played an 
important part in two of the three financial crises surveyed, but is neither the only, nor the 
                                                            
59 “Why Bank of America Must be Thrilled to Pay a 3 Billion Dollar Penalty," Yahoo! Finance, January 4, 2011. 
The U.S. government provided the Bank of America with a 30 billion dollar "back door" bailout by relieving it of all 
but 3 billion dollars of its liability for Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's likely cumulative bad mortgage losses. 35 
 
decisive aspect of the speculative equation as some have claimed.
60 The greatest menace lies 
elsewhere with various "public-private partnerships" using all means fair and mostly foul to 
create favorable speculative financial conditions for their personal enrichment, which when 
combined with under regulated white hot money flows, Chinese dollar reserve hoarding and 
stealth protectionism in the best scenario will seriously degrade global economic performance, 
and in the worst culminate a Black Swan catastrophe. 
                                                            
60 Joseph Stiglitz, "Contagion, Liberalization and the Optimal Structure of Globalization," Journal of Globalization 
and Development, January 3, 2011. Students of political economy also may wish to observe that victimization 
doesn't adhere to a simple class, or imperial pattern. The Japanese strove to mitigate the pain for the entire nation. 
Losses were widely dispersed in Asia across domestic and foreign entities. Russian government insiders victimized 
compatriots and gullible foreigners with malice of forethought. America and Europe have tried to shunt off losses on 
the unemployed and powerless middle class. 